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C E N T R A L   I N T E L L I G E N C E   A G E N C Y


19 November 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: US Intelligence Assessment of Soviet Long-Range  
Ballistic Missile Strength

1. Attached is a draft of "US Intelligence Assessment of Soviet Long-Range Ballistic Missile Strength," together with a draft transmittal memorandum to the Secretary of State from the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. These were considered by our representatives on 17 November and will be on the agenda of the USIB meeting to be held at 1030 Thursday, 30 November. Consideration of this paper and SNIE 11-13-61 has been postponed pursuant to a request by the Department of State.

  
CHESTER L. COOPER  
Deputy Assistant Director  
National Estimates

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

18 November 1961

DRAFT

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I transmit herewith copies of a document entitled "US Intelligence Assessment of Soviet Long-Range Ballistic Missile Strength." As you know, Mr. Hilsman originally drafted this at your request as a possible briefing paper which you would use in addressing

25X1  The present version has been reviewed in the intelligence community and received the approval of the United States Intelligence Board on 21 November.

In reaching agreement on the content of this paper, we confronted three problems of great importance. There is the problem of discussing our most sensitive source of intelligence in such a way as to make our findings highly credible without at the same time explicitly or implicitly revealing the nature of the source. We have coped with this matter in the first paragraph.

The second problem arises from our feeling that the chances are extremely high that the Soviets will quite rapidly learn the almost exact nature of your remarks. We do not believe that such

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an address as yours can be kept secret. We have accordingly agreed that it would be a mistake to put into Soviet hands our estimates regarding probable Soviet missile strength in the years ahead. You will perceive where we have blurred these estimates by omitting numbers.

The third problem is that of the dissenting views which the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, has registered in the parent document, NIE 11-8/1-61, "Strength and Deployment of Soviet Long Range Ballistic Missile Forces," dated 28 September 1961.

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Sincerely yours,

ALLEN W. DULLES  
Director

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